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Abstract. Most of the MANET security research has so far focused on 
providing routing security and confidentiality to the data packets, but less has 
been done to ensure privacy and anonymity of the communicating entities. In 
this paper, we propose a routing protocol which ensures anonymity, privacy of 
the user. This is achieved by randomly selecting next hop at each intermediate. 
This protocol also provides data security using public key ciphers. The protocol 
is simulated using in-house simulator written in C with OpenSSL crypto APIs. 
The robustness of our protocol is evaluated against known security attacks. 
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1   Introduction 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are autonomous collection of mobile nodes 
without any fixed infrastructure that communicate over relatively bandwidth 
constrained wireless links, establishing dynamic communication. The nodes in a 
MANET may change its’ position, adjust transmission and reception parameters 
causing links to be broken and re-established. A malicious node or an attacker can 
easily eavesdrop into the wireless channels and infer communication.  A malicious 
node may even drop packets it had otherwise agreed to forward earlier. It may even 
go the extent of creating denial of service, exploited by injecting large number of 
unwanted packets into the network. So far, researchers in MANETs have generally 
studied the routing problem in a non-adversarial network setting, assuming a trusted 
environment; relatively little research has been done in a more realistic setting in 
which an adversary may attempt to disrupt the communication. 
In this paper we present an anonymous routing protocol for a MANET. The 
protocol seeks to achieve anonymity with the minimal use of encryption and nullify 
the requirement of padding of data packet to prevent traffic analysis. In the protocol 
the next hop is dynamically selected by the router. This makes traffic analysis for a 
malicious router difficult as the traffic flow is erratic and confuses the adversary.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we present related work in Section 2; 
in Section 3, we present system model of our approach; and using this model, in 
Section 4, we present our Anonymous routing algorithm; in Section 5 & 6, we present 
the simulation results and analysis of our protocol respectively; finally, in Section 7, 
we summarize our work and point out several future research directions. 
2. Related Work 
Due to the nature of wireless environment and unavailability of fixed 
infrastructure, achieving security in MANET routing is a complex task. Onion routing 
[1,6] uses multiple layers of encryptions wrapped around the message. Each router in 
the path of the onion receives a message, performs a set of cryptographic operations 
on the message and then forwards it. Each router uncovers a layer of encryption using 
its private key, this allows it to access routing instructions for the next router. This 
process continues until the message reaches the last router. Papadimitriou and Haas 
[2] proposed a secure routing protocol for MANETs using a security association 
between source and destination to validate the integrity of a discovered route. Sanzgiri 
et al. [3] have proposed cryptographic ways to secure routing in MANETs wherein 
every intermediate node verifies the integrity of the message and then forwards it to 
the next node. Certificates are used by source and destination nodes to get the public 
key of each other. ASR [4] uses anonymous virtual circuit in routing and data 
forwarding where each node does not know its immediate upstream nodes and 
immediate downstream nodes. Using a special anonymous signaling procedure, the 
node only knows the physical presence of neighboring ad hoc nodes. The session key 
of the route between every pair of the intermediate nodes is determined when a node 
forwards reply packet to its upstream nodes.  Although the above mentioned 
anonymous routing techniques can provide a certain level of anonymity, an external 
adversary can still monitor the transmitted packets to identify the communication 
peers [5]. 
3. System Model 
We explain here the notations, assumptions and the system model. An example of our 
approach is shown in fig. 1.As depicted in fig. 1, every node in the network maintains 
ART and ARC. Destination maintains PIT and IRT as well. Source node starts with 
the route discovery message (routeRequest) by flooding it to all neighbors.Request, id 
is embedded in it. 
 Notations used: 
S  :Sender   R : Receiver 
M  :Message   D : Data 
X  :Intermediate node  E : Encrypt function 
ccCount :Criss-cross count  ccTimer: Criss-cross timer 
PUN  :Public key of N  PRR : Private Key of N 
D  :Decrypt function  ccTable : Criss cross Timer Table 
ART  :Anonymous Routing Table 
IRT  :Intermediate Routing Table<pathID, path_of_message> 
PIT  :Path Info Table <pathID, nodeID, nextHop> 
  :Set inclusion, modeled as appending at the end of set (array) 
ARC  :Anonymous Routing Cache  <reqID, ccCount> 
exists(x,z) :returns true if table z has record mapped to  x, otherwise false. 
getCnt(x) : returns ccCount value from the record <x, ccCount> of ARC, if no such record 
found then return false. 
setCnt(x, y) : sets ccCount value from the record <x, ccCount> of ARC to y. 
expired(x) :returns true if timer mapped to x is expired else false. 
 Fig.1.  An Example of Secure Anonymous Routing Protocol. 
Data portion D of the message contains pathID, Source(S), Destination (D) and 
Nonces which is encrypted using the public key of destination (PUD). Message also 
contains I, set of all nodes traversed by routeRequest message to reach destination, 
and PUD.Every entry in I is encrypted using PUD.  
ccCnt indicates the number of more routeRequest messages with same request id 
that can be flooded by the same node. Initially assigned value to ccCnt is a parameter 
set by network administrator, subject to tuning. Upon receiving routeRequest message 
with given reqID first time, node makes an entry in ARC(as shown in fig 1, at node 
3), inserting reqID and ccCnt. For subsequent receipts of routeRequest message with 
same reqID, node checks whether value of ccCnt is zero or not. If zero then ccCnt 
limit is reached and packet is discarded there itself. If not zero then ccCnt is 
decremented by 1 and message is forwarded to neighbors by appending its 
id(encrypted with PUD) in I field of the message.  
Upon receiving the route request message, destination node takes action as 
explained in previous paragraph with following additional steps: it sets ccTimer for 
given reqID. ccTimer also acts as a threshold like ccCnt, but it is used to filter optimal 
paths. It is also subject to tuning by network administrator. Destination decrypts D 
and I part of message using its private key(PRD) to extract NONCES, pathID and all 
en-route nodes which are entered into IRT (i.e. <P1, <0,1,4,6>> of IRT at node 6 in 
fig. 1). There is one to one mapping between pathID and reqID. Whenever ccCnt 
becomes zero or ccTimer expires for a given reqID, node creates PIT from IRT to be 
used for updating routing tables of en-route nodes. As depicted in fig. 1, for IRT entry 
<P1, < 0, 1, 4, 6>>, it updates PIT entries as <P1, 0, <1>>, <P1, 1, <4>>, <P1, 4, 
<6>>, <P1, 6, <>>. For <P1, < 0, 3, 4, 6>>, it updates PIT as <P1, 0, <1, 3>>, <P1, 3, 
<4>>, <P1, 4, <6>>, <P1, 6, <>>. This is used to construct routeReply messages, 
composed of routing table updates of en-route nodes. Destination node encrypts these 
PIT entries with the public keys of en-route nodes, in the sequence marked in the 
routeRequest message and onion routing [1, 6] is used to forward these updates to en-
route nodes. NONCER, F(NONCES) are also added to message encrypted using public 
key of Source.   
Upon receiving the routeReply message, the intermediate node removes outermost 
layer from the onion, does appropriate cryptographic operations on it, updates its 
ART from the update received, and forwards the message to the next hop. Upon 
receiving the routeReply message, the source node updates it’s ART as explained for 
en-route nodes. It receives NONCER and F(NONCES), which are used for 
authentication and preventing the replay attack. For regular data transfer, source uses 
the pathID, and selects the next hop randomly from its ART. Every en-route node also 
does the same for selection of the next hop.  
Here we assume that any node leaving the network does not cause the partition in 
the MANET. Every node(X) sends a beacon to its neighbor, and updates the status of 
neighbors depending upon the reply. If any node NLdiscovers change in the topology 
of network then it searches <pathID, Z> in ART such that NL Z. If such entry is 
found then it sends the update message to all nodes in Z and removes NL from Z. 
After removing the entry, if Z is empty then node floods the route invalidate message 
with corresponding pathID. Upon receiving the update message, node updates its 
ART. In case the node receiving the invalidate message is the one that started the 
communication with the corresponding pathID, it re-initiates route discovery. 
4. Proposed Algorithm 
4.1 Path Discovery Phase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source initiates with routeRequest message<reqID, E(PUR,D), I> ;D=, <pathID, sourceID, 
destinationID, NONCES>, I={E(PUR, S)} by sending to all neighbors. 
X (≠R), an intermediate node receives routeRequest<reqID, E(PUR,D), I>message:  
if ( exists(reqID, ARC)  getCnt(reqID) ≠ 0)then 
setCnt(reqID, getCnt(reqID) - 1) /* decrement the ccCount */ 
II∪{ E(PUR, X)}   /* Append ID to the message*/ 
forward  <reqID, E(PUR, D), I>  to neighbors except the one from it received. 
elif(exists(reqID, ARC)  getCnt(reqID) = 0)then  
Discard routeRequest message as ccCnt limit reached. 
else 
ARC ARC {<reqID, ccCntUL>}  /* Make entry in ARC */ 
II∪{ E(PUR, X)}   /* append ID in message */ 
forward<reqID, E(PUR, D), I> to neighbors. 
endif 
Send acknowledgement to the node (sourceID) from which message is received. 
R receives routeRequest message MRQ<reqID, sourceID, destinationID, E(PUR, D), I>:  
Decrypt each entry of I private key, store decrypted values in I. 
if ( exists(reqID, ARC)  expired(ccTimerreqID) )then 
 Discard routeRequest message.  /* Timer Expired */ 
elif ( exists(reqID, ARC)  ¬expired(ccTimerreqID)  getCnt(reqID) = 0))then 
 
   
 
 
 
4.2 Construction of Routing Table entries for intermediate nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Updating ART of intermediate nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discard routeRequest message.  /* Criss-cross count limit reached */ 
elif ( exists(reqID, ARC)  ¬expired(ccTimerreqID)  getCnt(reqID) ≠ 0))then  
setCnt ( reqID, getCnt(reqID) - 1) 
pathID D(PRR, E(PUR, D))     
IRT IRT∪ {<pathID, I ∪ {R} >} 
else  (¬exists(reqID, ARC), ARC)    /* No entry found in ARC for reqID */ 
ccTableccTable∪ {<pathID, ccTimerMrq>} /* Set ccTimer*/ 
ARC ARC∪ {<reqID, 5>}   
pathID D(PRR, E(PUR, D)    
IRT IRT∪ {<pathID, I ∪ {R} >} 
endif 
/*Process entries in IRT with reqID for with ccCnt is zero or ccTimer is expired*/ 
for each <reqID, I> in IRT  do    
for each xi in I;xi≠R,do  
 if exists(<pathID, xi,  Z>, PIT)then  
Update ZZ∪{ xi+1} in PIT  
else 
PIT PIT∪ {<pathID,xi, { xi+1}> } 
endif 
end for 
end for 
 
Constructing and sending Reply Message: 
for each <pathID, I>in IRT do 
 I’=     /* initialize I’ as Null*/ 
for each xi in I, i=n…1 do  /* Reverse the path for reply message */ 
 I’=I’ ∪ {xi} 
endfor 
temp=< NONCER , F(NONCES)> 
for each xi in I’, xi≠R do 
 Search <pathID, xi , Z> in PIT 
if  i=1 then   /* for source node’s case */ 
 msg = msg + <S , E(PUxi, <<pathID, xi , Z>, temp>) > 
else msg = msg + <xi-1 , E(PUxi, <pathID, xi , Z>) > 
endif 
end for 
Send routeReply message MRP  <R, xn-1, msg> to xn-1  /*<source, to, msg_data> */ 
end for  
X receives the routeReply message MRP <Y, X, msg>: 
/* extract the routing info sent by the destination and update ART */ 
<<pathID, X , Z >, nextHop, E(PUnextHop , msg) > = D(PRx, msg) 
ART = ART ∪ {<pathID,  Z>}    /*Update routing table*/ 
if X=S then 
 <pathID, NONCER , F(NONCES)> = D(PRS, msg) 
 Send F(NONCER) to the destination. 
else 
forwardMRP <X, nextHop, msg> 
endif 
 
4.4 Data Communication Phase 
Source-destination pair exchanges session key for regular data transfer. Source sends 
message with pathID prepended to the message. Every intermediate node will choose 
the next hop dynamically from its ART corresponding to the pathID in the message. 
We have employed acknowledgement mechanism for detection of passive nodes. 
5. Simulation Results  
We have written our simulator using C in UNIX. All cryptographic operations are 
performed using OpenSSL Crypto API. MANET is constructed using 50 nodes, 
initially uniformly distributed. Source destination pairs are chosen randomly. Mobility 
of nodes is random, with constant speed. Once node becomes immobile, it waits there 
for fixed time. Maximum number of communicating pairs in MANET at a given time 
is assumed to be 20, chosen randomly. We use cc_cnt, and cc_timer metrics as global 
tunable parameters which are set by network administrator. As depicted from the 
cc_cnt vs delay graph in fig. 2, by increasing the value of ccCnt, the number of paths 
discovered is more. However few of these paths might be longer ones. So the delay 
incurred on an average to reach the destination also increases. 
 
Fig. 2. cc_timer vs Randomness_index  Fig. 3. cc_cnt vs Delay 
 
 
Fig. 4. Traffic Load vs Control Packets  Fig. 5. Mobility vs Control Packets 
 Fig. 3 shows the cc_timer vs randomness_index, the average number of nodes in 
each intermediate node’s ART, for a given pathID. The linear increase in this 
randomness_index guarantees higher anonymity because of the fact that more number 
of paths is now available to make traffic analysis increasingly difficult in the 
MANET. Fig. 4 shows the mobility vs control packet and fig. 5 shows traffic load vs 
control packets. Both the figures show that increase in mobility increases number of 
the control packets. This is because of flooding many packets that include path 
invalidation, path update and route rediscovery messages. 
6. Simulation Analysis 
6.1 Anonymity Analysis 
Identity Privacy: In our protocol, the identities of source and destination are known 
to only two communicating parties, as we are using them only in the route request 
message and with encryption, thereby not revealing them to intermediate nodes. 
Hence identity privacy is ensured. 
Route Anonymity: In our protocol, no adversary can trace a flow of packet because 
of random selection of next hop and thereby leading to dynamic path selection. Any 
adversary on the route has no information about the path other than the next hop. As 
we have employed fixed size padding, we can introduce several dummy packets and 
reshuffling of actual packets in the buffer to eliminate the possibility of temporal 
analysis as defined in [12]. Thus all the requirements of route anonymity are satisfied. 
6.2 Possible attacks 
Route Rediscovery Attack: One possible attack is that adversaries send fake route 
update or route invalidate packets to fool the intermediate nodes or source to begin 
route rediscovery process.  In our protocol, only the nodes whose routing table has 
entry for the node leaving the network, can send the route invalidate, route 
rediscovery or route update messages whichever applicable as explained in the 
algorithm. So our proposed protocol is less vulnerable to the route rediscovery attack. 
Selfish Nodes or Byzantine nodes: Byzantine nodes can intercept packets, create 
routing loops, selectively drop packets, or purposefully delay packets. Our protocol 
uses the acknowledgement mechanism. If any node is dropping the packet then 
acknowledgement will not be sent to sender. Even in presence of live communication 
link, if node is dropping packets then it can be detected as selfish node. And as we are 
choosing next hope dynamically at any intermediate node for routing, we can exclude 
this selfish node from the ART. 
6.3 Cryptographic Overhead 
In our protocol, we use cryptosystem of the form onion only for path discovery. 
For data communication, data is encrypted by source with the destinations’ public 
key, i.e. end to end encryption; onion routing is not used here. So there is not much 
cryptographic overhead involved for normal data communication phase that leads to 
computational advantage. 
7. Conclusions 
 
This has paper has proposed a new routing protocol in mobile ad hoc networks 
with anonymity and provable security. We have stressed upon the anonymity, which 
is becoming one of the most important aspect in securing the next generation mobile 
ad hoc networks. The developed protocol has been evaluated with respect to 
anonymity and known security threats. Simulation results give the performance of our 
protocol. Our future work will aim at overcoming Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack, and estimating the cryptographic computation overhead in this type of 
environment. We will also focus on improving security by adopting strong peer to 
peer authentication in the route discovery phase using extensive simulations.  
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